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Politics costs money. Television ads, billboards, fliers, phone banks:
the normal tools of democracy have to be paid for somehow. Unless
the government decides to fund every campaign — and to ban anyone
else from spending money on speech — then politicians will have to
raise funds of their own.
In his Comment on political corruption,1 Professor Samuel Issacharoff rightly rejects the standard tropes of political corruption — that
money corrupts, and that lots of money corrupts absolutely. Issacharoff performs a useful service by questioning these traditional accounts
and by focusing attention instead on the effects that private influence
can have on government policy. Unfortunately, the very breadth of his
analysis runs the risk of turning corruption into too general a category
to be useful, at least as a ground for legislation. In this Response, I
propose a slight refinement on Issacharoff’s model, in the hopes of limiting the concept of corruption to a manageable scope.
So long as private citizens are allowed to favor some candidates
over others, elected officials will respond in kind, devoting public resources to particular private ends. No regulation can hope to stop
that. What we might hope to control, however, is whether the government favors some candidates over others, by channeling public resources into self-sustaining political machines. If protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least
attempt to protect the government from itself.
I. ISSACHAROFF’S DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION
A. Corruption as Clientelism
Despite the central role it has played in campaign finance reform,
the “very concept of corruption was never clearly defined.”2 Some corruption is easy to classify: government officials can’t trade official acts
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for personal benefits, like a briefcase full of cash. Many people view
campaign contributions and other political spending the same way, as
a bribe that wealthy interests pay to get the results they want. But
campaign expenditures — particularly independent expenditures uncoordinated with candidates — are more complicated than that. The
money doesn’t inure to the candidate’s personal interest, and true quid
pro quo exchanges are rare (or hard to prove). In general, the law is
too blunt an instrument to divide bad contributors from good ones:
some people spend money to buy a candidate’s loyalty, while others
use their money to advocate for candidates with whom they share a
vision of good policy.
Issacharoff properly rejects the view that campaign contributions
are inherently corrupting. He turns away from these “inputs” to focus
instead on “outputs”: the “policies that result” from the incentives of
our electoral system.3 Issacharoff’s particular worry is “clientelism,”
the “patron-client relationship in which political support (votes, attendance at rallies, money) is exchanged for privileged access to public
goods.”4 As he frames the issue, the problem of corruption is that politicians “offer private gain from public action to distinct, tightly organized constituencies, which in turn may be mobilized to keep compliant public officials in office.”5 To fight clientelism, Issacharoff
would implement a combination of carrots and sticks — offering
matching funds to encourage small contributions, and restricting the
political activities of “those in a position to distort public policy —
such as government contractors” and (perhaps) public-sector unions.6
B. Where Does Clientelism Stop?
This framing of the issue has an intuitive appeal. But Issacharoff’s
notion of clientelism also contains something slippery. “[P]rivate gain
from public action” isn’t limited to government contractors or bigticket individual donors. Far more often, it’s found in the government’s relations to broader social groups with far greater aggregate political power. Farmers, homeowners, veterans, retirees: all have organized means of mobilizing support, as well as financial interests they
expect the government to serve. If a candidate supports a cost-ofliving increase in Social Security, and the voters who will receive that
increase donate to his campaign, is that democracy in action, or a corrupt reward for “offer[ing] private gain”?
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Those who donate usually believe the former. But it’s hard, when
one’s own interests are at stake, to make political decisions “with a
sole regard to justice and the public good.”7 A century ago, a British
legal scholar could ask with a straight face whether “the receipt of
poor relief, in the shape of a pension, shall be consistent with the pensioner’s retaining the right to join in the election of a Member of Parliament.”8 By contrast, “if receipt of government largesse were a disqualification,” then “[i]t would take a modern Diogenes with a powerpowerful lamp to find anyone today who could vote.”9
When politicians put private interests before the public good, they
act wrongly — even “corruptly.” But whether a politician is “corrupt”
in this subjective sense is impossible for the law to police. The politicians who support a cost-of-living increase in Social Security, even in
the absence of measured inflation, may be engaged in a public-spirited
(if selective) attempt to correct for systematic errors in the Consumer
Price Index. Or they might see it as a chance to buy off a wellorganized group of voters at the expense of future generations. Who
can tell? The campaign finance system surely can’t, at least not without putting Senators on the stand to testify about their motives.10 And
if “corruption” isn’t about subjective motives, whether of the candidate
or of the donor, then all that matters is the output of the process —
here, a politically powerful group securing a greater share of the public
fisc. Whether or not this seems “corrupt” will come down to one’s
views of good policy.
This type of soft clientelism is an endemic feature of politics. It
was perfectly obvious even to the Framers that “[a] landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest,”11
and others would all compete for the benefits of state policy: “Every
shilling with which they overburden the inferior number is a shilling
saved to their own pockets.”12 Nor is clientelism, as the concept is
used in political science, even “confined to politics in a restricted
sense.”13 Rather, it “proliferates in the arts, academia, religious congregations, the media, and business, wherever there is the power to
appoint and grant access to benefits, goods, services, influence, and
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honors.”14 Self-interested actions abound whenever people are given a
choice — and we cannot get rid of them unless we also get rid of
choices. “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without
which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty . . . because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air . . . .”15
C. Where Should Regulation Start?
Issacharoff is aware of this problem, and admits that clientelism is
“inescapable” in a democracy.16 He is content, in the absence of “precise substantive lines,” to focus on what he considers the worst cases
— the “express lanes” of private influence,17 through which “important
sectional supporters” may “‘gain privileged access to public resources’
for profit.”18 But when the problem is framed as broadly as “clientelism,” it’s hard to tell which cases are the worst. The politics of Social
Security and Medicare do far more damage to the public fisc than a
relatively tiny amount of earmarked spending. And no smoke-filledroom commitment could be better entrenched against public criticism
than a farm-state Senator’s endorsement of farm subsidies. When the
government’s budget is so heavily dominated by transfers among different groups, throwing up roadblocks to one pathway of private influence may just increase the relative force of another. Why care
about relative advantage, if the game is so thoroughly rigged?
Consider Issacharoff’s central proposal for additional regulation.
He favors further restrictions on the activities of federal contractors19
— who cannot make direct campaign contributions while their contracts are in effect20 — because such contractors have a “double hold”
on policy, exercising influence once in the political arena and again at
the bargaining table.21 Issacharoff analogizes these contractors to public employee unions, which have done very well for themselves by
combining the political power of an interest group with the coercive
power of a collective bargaining unit.22
The analogy, however, also shows the limits of the argument. A
public-sector union may be a concentrated interest group, but more
importantly it’s a monopolist: the government is forced to negotiate
with the union because the law says so. When the government buys
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goods or services from a monopoly provider, similar forces may be at
work — just as they are in the broader economy, where monopoly
power means consumers pay more. But when the government buys
some competitive good like paper clips, the contract is not a source of
influence; it is only one particular purpose to which influence may be
put. And even if contract negotiations themselves “bypass the normal
process of interest group bargaining,”23 an agency’s overall budget
does not. Much of the time, a contractor may have no more influence
than anyone else seeking government largesse — and the influence it
has may be owed less to campaign spending than to personal connections or ties to a particular congressional district.24
That, perhaps, is why Issacharoff sees regulation of government
contractors as merely “a partial inroad” into “the sector of the economy
that does not face incumbent state officials as contracting parties but
as subjects of regulation.”25 In other words, all of the economy. Issacharoff’s broader goal of “insulat[ing] politics from the demands of
those who would use public power for nonpublic-regarding aims”26
will only be achieved when nobody is allowed to vote.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The difficulty of confining anti-clientelist reforms within any manageable limits suggests that we should look elsewhere. Issacharoff,
however, implicitly points to an alternative framing of the problem,
when he suggests that those subject to campaign finance regulation
“may welcome such a law as a protection against public officials intent
on using their position to solicit funds for campaign expenditures.”27
Rather than trying to protect government resources from private actors, we might focus on protecting those resources from the politicians
themselves — that is, preventing the diversion of government resources into self-funding political machines. That focus might avoid
some of the gauziness of Issacharoff’s platform, while explaining his
policy proposals’ intuitive appeal.
A. The Fight Against Machines
The United States already has substantial experience with government-funded politics. Under the nineteenth-century spoils system — a
clientelist system if there ever was one — government employees were
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added to the public payroll in exchange for redirecting a substantial
chunk of their salaries back to the party hierarchy. By 1878, as much
as “ninety percent of the money raised by the Republican congressional
committee came from assessments on federal officeholders.”28
Today, the Hatch Act restricts the political activities of certain federal employees.29 The Supreme Court has explained this restriction as
designed to prevent officeholders from using the government workforce “to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political
machine,” with “hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for
at public expense,” staffing a single party’s “political structure and political campaigns.”30 By taking voluntary political activity off the table, the Act reduces the danger that government employees will be
coerced into “perform[ing] political chores in order to curry favor with
their superiors.”31
B. The Anti-Machine Approach
Whether these particular limitations (or any others) are compatible
with the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Response.32 But
viewing campaign finance regulations through an anti-machine lens
could provide a useful limitation on overly general pictures of clientelist politics. While both visions concern the diversion of public resources into private hands, the anti-machine approach addresses a particular type of diversion, one that uniquely benefits incumbent
politicians. Whether a contractor seeks a plum contract in return for a
donation, or an official demands a contribution before the contract
goes through, the result of the kickback is that excess public spending
winds up directly in the politician’s own war chest.33 The particular
problem with government contractors is not that they are in a “posi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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tion to distort public policy”34 — aren’t we all? — but that they are
more liable to be misused by, and thus need protection from, those in
government.
More importantly, political machines can pose a greater danger to
democracy than any mere handful of contractors on the make. If politicians are spending a few million here and there for private gain, we
only lose the money. But if the candidates who won the last election
can vote themselves ever larger campaign treasuries, it will be that
much harder to unseat them in the next election. A clientelist Congress still must search for patrons, but a self-sustaining machine is far
less susceptible to democratic control.
An anti-machine approach also helps clarify which problems are
easily remediable through legislation and which are not. Without
committing to a particular political platform, no anticorruption effort
can identify which government programs are actually diverting public
resources to private gain. (Student loans? Veterans’ benefits? The
mortgage interest tax deduction?) But when the government embarks
on a large-scale spending or regulatory project, only a vanishingly
small proportion of the money changing hands will actually return to
candidates in the form of contributions. These programs are largely
enacted for independent reasons; some good, some bad. By contrast,
there are plenty of government giveaways that virtually no one would
support, but for their propensity to show up later in a political campaign fund.35 The broader and more transparent the program (block
transportation grants for states, say, rather than funds for individual
bridges), the harder it will be for machines to capture.
In other words, the goal of anti-machine regulation would be to ensure that political self-dealing can only be done inefficiently, at much
greater budgetary cost, and with most of the spending going elsewhere.
That may seem strange. But tying self-dealing to larger projects
means that each abuse will cost enough money for someone else to notice. (As usual, sunlight is the best disinfectant.) If the goal of campaign finance reform is achievable change, rather than a wholesale revision of the democratic process, an anti-machine framework might do
better than the “clientelism” label at explaining why the worst offenders are really the worst.
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34
35

Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 121.
Cf. Shailagh Murray, For a Senate Pork Barrel Foe, Two Bridges Too Far, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/20/
AR2005102001931.html.

2011]

CORRUPTION, CLIENTS, AND POLITICAL MACHINES

69

C. Machines and Matching Grants
The anti-machine approach may also make better sense of Issacharoff’s other policy proposal: public matching grants for small individual donations.36 The 2008 election saw an extraordinary outpouring of
small donations to presidential candidates.37 Matching, say, the first
$100 of each donation with government funds would encourage candidates to seek broad-based financial support, and would double the importance of small donors as compared to government contractors or
corporate fat cats.
Stated in this fashion, a program of matching donations plainly has
nothing to do with clientelism — understood in the very general sense
as politics that directs public resources into private hands. Perhaps
small donors are thought to be less greedy than large ones (or, because
they have less money, just bad at it). But plenty of large donors act for
public-spirited — or “ideological” — reasons, and plenty of small donors expect material benefits from the candidates they support. Becoming “the farmers’ candidate” or “the candidate of Social Security”
is much easier if $100 donations from farmers and retirees have
doubled in value. Matching might reduce the relative influence of the
most concentrated special interests, but it increases the influence of
somewhat-less-special interests that are still better organized than average.38 (Would public-sector unions be more or less powerful if their
members’ donations were doubled?)
In the terminology of the Supreme Court, matching grants are actually aimed at “distortion,” the presumed discrepancy between a
view’s actual popularity and its expression in political speech.39
Matching makes some voices louder and others less so. As a result, it
reproduces all the problems of the distortion rationale: how does the
government decide whose voices, supporting which policies, deserve
greater influence?40 In some ways, matching would make the distortion problem even worse. The class of those inclined to donate $100 is
even more limited, and demographically less diverse, than the embarrassingly small group of Americans who vote. If matching grants became a significant force in elections, we might expect to see politicians
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trying harder (than they already do) to promote the interests of America’s mass upper class.41 Whether or not that would be a bad thing, it
sure wouldn’t be populist.
What matching could do, though, is make progress against the specifically political diversion of government funds. Any spending program sufficiently broad-based to attract $100 donations would be unlikely to funnel much of its spending back into politicians’ coffers. In
one sense, of course, matching donations is an odd idea: to prevent covert government subsidies of political campaigns, it requires overt government subsidies of political campaigns. The point, however, is to
make those subsidies in a more evenhanded way.
Whether matching is worth the cost is an open question. But it
makes more sense as a means of forestalling machine politics than as a
means of turning politics away from private gain.
III. THE LIMITS OF REFORM
A final, and perhaps paradoxical, advantage of an anti-machine
framework is that it so clearly leaves many other problems unaddressed. The temptation in campaign finance reform is to imagine
that politicians can, in a single stroke, repeal the logic of collective action. They can’t. No matter what law is passed tomorrow, concentrated interest groups will still win out against broader but less organized coalitions. As Issacharoff noted in an earlier work, “political
money, like water, has to go somewhere.”42 An effort to prevent individuals and groups from spending their own money to advocate for
politicians they support will either fail, or will succeed at too great a
cost to the First Amendment to be worthwhile. The government can
certainly try to put its own resources to proper use — but it can’t keep
private interests out of politics.
For this reason, reformers trying to improve public policy should
pay attention not only to legal institutions, but also to the broader political culture. Many countries still have widespread clientelism in the
traditional sense, with plenty of bribery and spoils mixed in. In others
— including, with all its problems, the United States — politics is fundamentally much healthier. The reason isn’t just the wisdom of our
campaign finance regulation: bribery is illegal pretty much everywhere. Far more important than these “parchment barriers”43 is a cultural commitment to a politics centered on producing public goods, not
transferring resources from one hand to another.
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The political culture also has a great deal to do with the structure
of campaign finance. Part of the reason why campaigning is so expensive is that so few people will follow politics for free. Media coverage,
word of mouth, and positive “buzz” are worth hundreds of millions of
dollars in paid advertising,44 and could be worth even more if more
people paid attention to them. Again, as Issacharoff has rightly noted
in a prior article, the most problematic thing about “media-intensive,
idea-sparse, special-interest-funded campaign tactics” is that they may
work.45
Furthermore, if the demand for special treatment is endemic in a
democracy, perhaps reformers should focus on the supply. There is
always more room for clientelism when more of the economy is subject
to political control. Likewise, if unenacted earmarks in committee reports, congressional interference in contract negotiations, or special
pleading to create jobs in particular industries were seen as outrages
rather than daily events, there would be fewer avenues to transfer public revenues to private hands. As Issacharoff notes, “lobbies for special
interests can sometimes succeed where matters are detailed or complex
but not when they are general and simple.”46 Channeling the emotional energy behind campaign finance reform into a push for simplicity and transparency in government would help counter the powerful
political pressures to keep government complex, expensive, and firmly
in the private interest.
None of these goals can be achieved by enactment. What reformers can look forward to is not a single broad stroke of perfectly designed legislation, but “an unceasing struggle to clear paths through
the jungle.”47 Issacharoff’s effort to flesh out the concept of corruption
is an extremely useful start. But recognizing the very difficulty of conceptualizing corruption may be the first step to fighting it.
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